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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to present a re-evaluation of the 
reign of England’s King John (1199–1216) from a fiscal perspective. 
The paper seeks to explain John’s innovations in terms of widening 
the scope and severity of tax assessment and revenue collection. In 
particular, the paper seeks to highlight the significance of Hubert 
Walter as the king’s financial adviser. He exercised a moderating influ-
ence in the first half of John’s reign and was the guiding hand in the 
successful introduction of innovative measures designed to increase 
revenues. These became extreme after his death in 1205, when John 
lacked his counsel. It is further suggested that the Magna Carta was 
a direct reaction to such financial severity. Many of the clauses in 
Magna Carta refer specifically to John’s tax innovations and severity. 
Linked to this, the paper argues that these events were critical to the 
establishment of the principle of taxation by consent. As a result of 
the innovative and extreme nature of John’s fiscal measures, it is our 
contention that John is a significant influence in moving away from 
deep-rooted feudal systems to the beginnings of what we would now 
understand as a national taxation system. This occurred against the 
background of a period of transition in state finance from a domain-
based to a tax-based state.
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INTRODUCTION
 The aim of this paper is re-examine the reign of King John 
(1199-1216) in terms of revenue raising, with particular refer-
ence to the innovative, and often severe, taxation measures 
implemented during these years to widen the scope of assess-
ment and collection. The paper aims to show how the genesis of 
the Magna Carta lay in resentment of the barons towards John’s 
fiscal exactions, which, after the loss of Normandy in 1204 and 
the death of his key adviser, Hubert Walter in 1205, were per-
ceived as excessive. The Magna Carta’s clauses refer explicitly 
to John’s fiscal exactions and the resentment felt against them. 
Emerging from this negative reaction was the concept that taxa-
tion required the consent of those upon whom it was imposed, 
representing a significant step away from feudal systems.
 John’s reign corresponded with an important period of 
financial history for several reasons. During the 12th and 13th 
centuries, most European states experienced a period of transi-
tion from a domain-based state to a tax-based state1 [Ormrod, 
1999, p. 38], with a clear move towards establishing the state on 
an economic foundation separate from its ruler [Swanson, 1999, 
p. 100]. This reflected the extent to which revenues derived from 
lands and possessions under a ruler’s personal control ceased to 
be sufficient to finance the activities, particularly military, and 
ambitions a ruler wished to pursue. The need to raise additional 
revenue increasingly necessitated resort to state sources of fi-
nance of which taxation was the most important [see Frecknall 
Hughes and Oats, 2004, p. 204]. This transition is important 
for understanding the context of John’s reign as expenditure re-
quirements prompted John to engage in a series of innovations 
in terms of widening the scope and severity of tax assessment 
and revenue collection.
 John’s need for additional finance was occasioned by several 
factors. The one usually given most prominence was the loss in 
1A domain-based state is one where its ruler relies solely on income from his 
own, personally administered lands and property to sustain him and his govern-
ment. A tax-based state is one where such personal income is supplemented, if not 
superseded, by income from taxes raised from property other than that directly 
owned by the ruler (e.g., on church property or on trade). Strictly, in England at 
this time, the Crown ultimately owned all land but did not administer or receive 
revenues directly from all of it. Such revenues were claimed by the tenants-in-
chief (the barons) to whom land had been given for services rendered, etc. For a 
comparative overview of the emergence of the tax state in medieval England and 
France, see Levi [1988].
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1204 of Normandy and its attendant revenues2 at a time when 
wars with France, fought on the continent to retain control of 
hitherto English-ruled states, were endemic.3 A second factor 
was the continuing development of the machinery of govern-
ment, begun especially under Henry II, which required more 
paid officials, a trend continued into the 14th century [Waugh, 
1997, p. 58]. The complexity of government in the period is 
reflected in the increasingly detailed financial records which 
have survived.4 A third factor was the continuation of some of 
the expensive policies begun by Richard, John’s brother and 
predecessor, such as the cost of maintaining castles [see Barratt, 
1999, p. 86]. Moreover, it should be remembered that as Richard 
too had needed exceptional funds for his leadership of the Third 
Crusade, and then for his ransom when captured and held by 
Duke Leopold of Austria on his return, John inherited a realm 
with considerably fewer resources than might otherwise have 
been expected.
 John’s willingness to push the boundaries of what was ac-
ceptable, both in terms of attempts to rack up income from a 
more intense exploitation of existing taxes and the creation of 
new sources in the period after the loss of Normandy in 1204, 
can also be attributed to the death in 1205 of Hubert Walter, 
who, as the king’s chief financial adviser, had hitherto exercised 
a considerable moderating influence on John’s revenue-raising 
activities. Walter was a key figure in state finance during this 
2See Powicke [1960] for a detailed history of the loss of Normandy. In addi-
tion to the loss of revenues, it was ensured that John was physically present in 
England for the years after 1204. The extent to which the measures of 1204 and 
after are attributable to his actual presence is arguable, but he was at least avail-
able to be involved in a way that, for example, Richard I could not be. Richard was 
only present in England for about six months of his ten-year reign.
3for example, the need to raise scutage in the years 1204-1206
4These records include Pipe Rolls (essentially audit documents), Rolls of Let-
ters Patent, Rolls of Letters Close, Rolls of Charters, and the Rolls of the King’s 
Household (Curia Regis), all aimed at keeping track of different material, for ex-
ample, debts to the crown [Warren, 1997, pp. 125-135]. They are referred to as 
“rolls,” as records were written on pieces of vellum, joined together and rolled up. 
For a discussion of the emergence of these and other written records, see Clanchy 
[1979]. The extant records are available in their original form in national/local 
collections, such as at the National Archives (formerly the Public Record Office) 
at Kew in London. Most are also published in sets of volumes which are avail-
able in any good history library. The Pipe Roll Society in the U.K. is dedicated to 
publishing such records by reference to regnal years. However, the records are 
predominantly written in medieval Latin, which makes them difficult to deal with 
other than by the specialist historian or classical scholar.
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 period, first under Richard I as justiciar5 (1193-1198) and then 
as John’s chancellor (1199-1205). He was also Archbishop of 
Canterbury. Warren [1997, p. 134] suggests that John was willing 
to listen to advice from Walter which is significant since John 
asked him to be his chancellor, an office he held until his death. 
It is more than likely that Walter’s considerable experience in 
serving John’s father, Henry II, and brother, Richard I, guided 
the fiscal policies adopted in the early years of John’s reign. 
Since he knew what would work and what was likely to be least 
resisted, there is evidence of a careful hand behind measures be-
fore 1204. Under his aegis, John successfully attempted a num-
ber of innovative revenue-raising measures, but after Walter’s 
death, John’s approach to revenue collection changed radically 
and was increasingly perceived as extortion. While many histori-
ans note the significance of the loss of Normandy in altering the 
character of John’s rule in England, few accord the same signifi-
cance to the death of Hubert Walter as an adviser. We contend, 
however, that this event was even more important. We argue 
that the change was largely influenced by the absence of Walter’s 
moderating influence.
 Not surprisingly, John’s fiscal ambitions, and the means by 
which he pursued them, provoked considerable resentment, an 
accumulation of grievances that was instrumental in precipitat-
ing the rebellion of barons that culminated in the famous Magna 
Carta.6 Taking advantage of John’s series of military reverses at 
the hands of the French, the disaffected barons, with the sup-
port of a number of bishops, organized an armed rebellion. 
The purpose was not to replace John, but rather to force him to 
agree to limits on his royal authority, to refrain from abusing his 
feudal rights, and to observe the rights of others as enshrined in 
law when dispensing royal justice. Rightly recognized as a major 
step towards establishing the pre-eminence of the rule of law 
over the exercise of the king’s will, this aspect of Magna Carta 
has resonated down the centuries and across different countries. 
However, it is less appreciated that Magna Carta was largely 
concerned with a detailed redress of the fiscal abuses which the 
barons believed John had perpetrated. Most significant of all, 
Magna Carta (clauses 12 and 14), recording John’s promise not 
5The justiciar was the chief minister of justice to the Norman and early An-
gevin kings (see footnote 35 for the meaning of “Angevin”). His power was second 
only to that of the king.
6The version of the Magna Carta referred to here is that in Appendix B of War-
ren [1997, pp. 265-277].
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to levy the taxes of “scutage” and “aid” without the “common 
counsel” of the kingdom, established the requirement, however 
rudimentary, of the need for consent to taxation.7
 Previous examinations of state finance in this period have 
not fully explored these issues or the direct link with Magna 
Carta. For example, Mitchell [1914] takes a very detailed ap-
proach to medieval taxation under John and Henry III, while 
Barratt [1999, 2001] is concerned with quantifying tax revenues 
under both Richard and John and is less concerned with the 
underlying rationale for the exactions. Ormrod [1999] focuses 
on the much wider issues of the rise of the fiscal state over an 
extended period and does not consider John’s reign in detail. 
Harriss [1975], however, does stress the importance of public 
consent to taxation as an outcome of Magna Carta, but he does 
not examine individual clauses since his investigation of public 
finance really begins at 1217. These studies are also located 
firmly in the mainstream history tradition as the significance of 
the available records remains largely unexplored in the account-
ing and financial history literature.
 In the accounting history literature, little has been writ-
ten about medieval accounting practices. In 1966, Jack [1966, 
p. 158] published a seminal paper in which she considered the 
neglect of medieval records by historians based on the false as-
sumption that they were inferior to later double-entry accounts 
and in some way inefficient. She ably demonstrates, however, 
that medieval accounts served their purpose of control, and as 
public accounts “kept because it was necessary to settle affairs 
between one man and another, whether the two were King and 
subject, man and servant, fellow servants or independent indi-
viduals.” Noke [1981], after examining 13th century accounting 
practice in lay and ecclesiastical estates, also concludes that me-
dieval accounts served their purposes of accounting and control, 
as well as some forecasting, although they were not able to cope 
well with complex series of transactions. He focuses on the dif-
fusion of techniques of written account keeping from the Royal 
Scaccarium8 to estate administrators. Despite theses studies, 
subsequent accounting history has continued to pay relatively 
little regard to medieval and earlier accounting practices albeit 
with some notable exceptions [e.g., Hoskin and Macve, 1986; 
Bryer, 1994; Harvey, 1994; Macve, 1994; Oldroyd 1995, 1997; 
Scorgie, 1997; McDonald, 2005].
7following Bartlett [2000, pp. 64-67]
8Scaccarium is a commonly used Latin term for Exchequer or Treasury.
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 More recently, a series of papers has been published con-
cerned with the Domesday Book and its significance. Although 
Domesday has been widely discussed in other branches of 
historical literature, recent scholarship shows the value of an 
analysis from an accounting perspective. The context of Domes-
day compilation has permitted re-evaluations of its significance. 
Economic historians McDonald and Snooks [1985] posited that 
the tax levied in Domesday England was not arbitrary, but was 
in fact correlated with ability to pay. Godfrey and Hooper [1996, 
p. 38] brought the debate to the accounting history literature 
arguing that Domesday was a “multidimensional document 
combining accountability and decision making.” Significantly, 
they highlight the importance of the social and political con-
texts, noting that the Domesday survey occurred during a period 
of potential military conflict and, therefore, heightened fiscal 
need. McDonald [2002] extended the consideration of Domes-
day within the accounting literature with the novel approach of 
 using a regression analysis to examine the distribution of the tax 
burden in Essex, finding significant differences by hundred,9 and 
concluding that the differences could be, in part, attributed to 
administrative practices.
 If studies of medieval accounting are still rare, this is 
even truer of taxation studies [Lamb, 2003]. Although there is 
evidence of a growing interest in tax and its relationship with 
accounting within the accounting history literature, most ex-
tant studies deal with later periods, e.g., the 18th [Crum, 1982; 
Kozub, 1983; Oats and Sadler, 2004] and the 19th [Lamb, 2001, 
2002; Oats and Sadler, 2007] centuries. Earlier periods were 
examined by Jose and Moore [1998] on Biblical taxation and 
Ezzamel [2002] on ancient Egyptian tax assessment and collec-
tion. To date there is very little examination of taxation in the 
medieval period. This paper seeks to remedy this shortfall by 
considering taxation and accounting practices in a key period of 
medieval history, the causes of change, and the dramatic conse-
quences that resulted.
 From our review of accounting and taxation practices in 
John’s reign, we conclude that there is a clear track from experi-
menting with new means of tax sources to what was regarded as 
extortion, specifically leading to Magna Carta wherein particular 
clauses provide evidence of the grievances arising from John’s 
measures. Of 61 clauses, well over half contain references to fis-
9A hundred is a community measure, a division of a county supposed to con-
tain a hundred families.
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cal grievances,10 indicating a deep dissatisfaction about the way 
sums of money were levied or goods/financial rights arbitrarily 
seized by the Crown. It is not usual to look at Magna Carta 
in this light as it is frequently cited as a source document for 
basic human freedoms as the outcome of a well-known political/
constitutional conflict between John and his barons [e.g., Bryce, 
1917, pp. xii-xiii; Carpenter, 1987, p. 69; Reynolds, 1997, p. 12]. 
Though its importance should not be underestimated, it is dan-
gerous to see it as a document apart from its own time [Holt, 
1992, chapter 1, passim, p. 188; Clanchy, 1998, pp. 139-140]. We 
contend that the underlying rationale for its existence was es-
sentially financial.
 The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we brief-
ly describe the key sources of revenue in the medieval period. 
Following that we examine the changes that were made under 
King John with emphasis on those occurring in the second part 
of his reign, which we argue were aberrant in the sense that they 
moved from innovation to extortion, unchecked by Hubert Wal-
ter’s moderating influence. In the third part, we consider Magna 
Carta as the outcome of rebellion against John’s excessive fiscal 
exactions. The final section presents our conclusions.
MEDIEVAL REVENUE RAISING
 Most writers [e.g., Mitchell, 1914] consider that royal 
revenues in the 12th century may be classed as ordinary and 
extraordinary. Mitchell [1914, p. 1] lists the ordinary revenues as 
follows:
• the county farm, a fixed sum paid by the sheriff for the 
privilege of farming the revenue of the royal domain and 
the fines of the local courts;
• amercements (“fines” in the modern sense of the word) 
imposed by the king’s justices for violation of the law;
• the firma burgi, a lump sum paid by certain towns for the 
privilege of farming the town revenues (which worked in 
a similar manner to the county farm);
10There are 23 clauses out of the 61 which do not have such direct references, 
but, even then, there is arguably a financial grievance underlying some of them; 
e.g., clause 35 referring to standardization of weights and measures; clause 39 
containing a reference to “disseising” (seizure of goods) of freedmen; clause 48, 
dealing with the removal of “evil customs” by sundry officials; and clause 49 deal-
ing with return of hostages.
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• the income from feudal incidents,11 reliefs, marriages, 
wardships, escheats, etc.; and
•	 fines or oblations (offerings), payments to the king for 
such privileges as permission to marry a certain per-
son, the custody of the lands of minors, the bringing of 
cases into the king’s court, the delaying or expediting of a 
trial, and the grant and confirmation of charters (some of 
which overlapped with feudal incidents)
To this list should be added:
•	 income from the royal forest
 Amercements, feudal incidents, etc., and fines/oblations may 
be termed “incidental” income as the events which gave rise to 
them depended on unpredictable events. While income would 
always arise from such events, the sources or events giving rise 
to them could not be guaranteed. The ordinary revenue, col-
lected every year through the normal processes of government, 
funded the ruler and his activities. If the ordinary revenue was 
insufficient, then additional contributions were sought. These 
additional contributions constituted extraordinary income, 
extraordinary because they were not levied every year and re-
quired new collection machinery to administer them. Mitchell 
[1914, pp. 1, 13] itemizes these additional contributions:
•	 the aid on the knight’s fee, called also scutage or shield 
money (see below for a detailed definition);
•	 carucage, levied on a unit of plough land called a caru-
cate;
•	 tallage, levied on the towns and domain lands of the 
Crown;
•	 dona or auxilia, taken from Jewish or other money lend-
ers, prelates, and religious houses; and
•	 the tax on movables
To this list should be added:
•	 church revenues which John received between the years 
1208-1214
11“Feudal incident” is a general term to refer to certain issues often concerned 
with inheritance or the devolution of property, such as a widow’s right to regain 
her dowry on the death of her husband and an heir’s succession to his father’s 
estate for which a sum (a relief) was payable. A woman or heir to property did not 
necessarily have the right to marry without the king’s permission and might have 
to pay to be able to do so. Estates of underage heirs might be assigned to a trustee 
in wardship until the heir became of age. An escheat is an estate which has re-
verted to an overlord for lack of an heir or because of a felony. Persons could pay 
sums to acquire wardships and estates in escheat. There is no hard and fast rule 
about the use of terminology here (see also, later discussion of “fine”).
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 All of these revenue-raising devices with the obvious excep-
tion of the appropriation of church revenues had existed under 
Henry II and Richard or even before. There is a sense in which 
some of the measures do not appear easily classifiable as taxes. 
For example, farming the royal domain could appear to some 
more like rent collection. This raises potentially unresolved 
questions about how to define a tax. Nevertheless, for this paper, 
all revenue-raising devices are considered the equivalents of tax 
measures. In the following section, we describe the most sig-
nificant of these forms of taxation, highlighting the changes that 
occurred under King John.
WIDENING THE SCOPE AND SEVERITY  
OF REVENUE COLLECTION
 In order to examine the extent and nature of these changes 
in the use of tax, we consider nine sources of revenue: the 
county farm, the royal forest, scutage, carucage, tallage, dona 
or auxilia, the tax on movables, and incidental revenue sources. 
 Peculiar to John’s reign, in addition, we consider the appro-
priation of church revenues. In general, John, initially guided by 
Walter, developed three main ways to increase revenue. First, an 
already accepted basis of assessment was widened by the use of 
an “add-on” to an existing revenue source as in the case of the 
county farm and scutage. Second, rates were raised or a tax col-
lected more frequently (e.g., scutage and tallage) which, when 
unchecked, were felt to be extortionate.12 Third, John was oppor-
tunistic, particularly in the appropriation of church revenues.
The County Farm: Ordinary revenue from shrieval (sheriffs’) ac-
counts is described by Barratt [2001, p. 637] as the “backbone of 
English state finance.” Warren [1987, p. 151] observed:
…Each sheriff on taking office agreed to pay a lump 
sum in respect of the revenues from the relevant lands 
12An outstanding example of this extortion, in relation to a feudal incident, 
was John’s asking the “fantastic” [Warren, 1997, p. 183] bride-price of 20,000 
marks (one mark was roughly two-thirds of an English pound sterling) for his 
former wife, Isabelle, Countess of Gloucester, which Geoffrey de Mandeville was 
compelled to pay to marry her. Even £1,000, a much lower sum, was felt to be 
high. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Geoffrey is one of the barons involved in the Magna 
Carta and was a suretor. However, the reason why John demanded so high a price 
probably has its roots in a quarrel so that the full truth can never be known [Nor-
gate, 1902, pp. 289-293].
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in the shire, and himself collected the rents or let the 
manor out to farm. The difference was his profit.
 In 1189, at the beginning of his reign, Richard I auctioned 
off the sheriffdoms to the highest bidders as a means of increas-
ing revenue [Warren, 1987, p. 152; Gillingham, 1999, pp. 114-
116], but the more usual way of obtaining increased revenue, as 
introduced by Henry II, was charging the sheriff an increment in 
addition to the farms.13 It would have been too radical to try for 
a complete re-assessment. Harris [1964, pp. 532-533] explains:
One solution of this problem would have been to assess 
new farms of the shires, but this may have seemed too 
serious a breach of a customary assessment. Instead, a 
number of increments had been imposed. These were 
fixed annual payments of round-figure sums, accounted 
for separately from the farms.
However, an attempt was made in 1194, when Walter was 
Archbishop of Canterbury and chief justiciar to Richard I, to 
enquire more exactly into the profitability of the royal domain 
by commissioning itinerant justices to make enquiries [Warren, 
1987, p. 153, quoting English Historical Documents, Vol. III, pp. 
304-305].
 In 1204, John began an experiment designed to increase his 
revenues from the English shrievalties [Harris, 1964, p. 532]. 
While there is no absolute proof, it is most likely that this was 
originally one of Walter’s ideas.14 The precise nature of the ex-
periment remains unclear. It may have been an attempt to exact 
a further increment, referred to as a profit or profits (proficuum); 
a new system of collecting the existing increment, which, con-
ceivably, could have been re-named proficuum; or a combination 
of both. It appears that many existing sheriffs were dismissed 
and succeeded by individuals called baillivi, who were required 
to account as custodians (instead of as farmers) for a variable 
amount over and above the standard farm. This meant that the 
custodian had to account for his income and expenditure on an 
item-by-item basis. This procedure seems to have applied to this 
variable element only; the farm itself was untouched. Rendering 
13Warren [1997, p. 38] comments that in Richard’s reign “[e]verything was for 
sale – privileges, lordships, earldoms, sheriffdoms, castles, towns, and suchlike.”
14Walter’s main biographers, Cheney [1967] and Young [1968], attest to his 
administrative skills and diplomatic talents. If such ideas are not attributable to 
him, then to whom might they be attributed since there was no person of similar 
talent or experience or of sufficient standing and authority at the time?
10
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account on an item-by-item basis was customary in the case of 
the administration of escheated lands and others temporarily in 
the king’s hands. There is little evidence as to how profits them-
selves were assessed or how the custodianships actually worked. 
Harris [1964, p. 536] cites evidence to show that the baillivus 
was becoming “a paid official with an expense account.” For 
example, in 1215, it was stated as right that Peter fitz Herbert 
should receive expenses for custody of Yorkshire and its royal 
castles because he was answering for his profits.15
 Warren [1987, p. 153, 1997, pp. 152-153] and Painter [1949, 
p. 120] consider that the experiment was a success in boosting 
revenues in the early years of John’s reign but that it foundered 
from about 1208. However, Harris [1964, pp. 538] disagrees, 
based on the Pipe Roll figures for 1209-1212, arguing for contin-
ued success up to 1213 or 1214. Yorkshire was placed under cus-
tody in 1209, which significantly increased income. In 1209 as 
well, the shrievalties of Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire, 
Devon, Essex and Hertfordshire, Hampshire, Lincolnshire, Rut-
land, Sussex and Warwickshire, and Leicestershire went over 
to the custodian system. In fact, all except Devon, Essex and 
Hertfordshire, and Rutland were returning to the system after a 
previous abandonment. 
 The picture emerges of a new system gradually being put 
in place, perhaps running in tandem with the old, but aiming 
to supersede it. This is not to deny that in some cases it failed 
to work or that it was unpopular. Some sheriffs made offers of 
money so as to be relieved from implementing the system, and 
sometimes the Exchequer failed to make sheriffs produce any 
accounts.16 Decline in profits was not unusual.17 Indeed, a sheriff 
often spent more than he collected, possibly because of inflation-
ary pressures, so that the Exchequer might owe him money. This 
situation could arise if there were heavy expenditures on castle 
maintenance or entertaining the king and his officials (e.g., John 
15Rot. Litt. Claus. i.187b
16Harris [1964, p. 538] cites the case of John Cornard, sheriff of Norfolk and 
Suffolk from 1205-1209, who consistently failed to produce any accounts, and of 
William de Montacute (of Dorset and Somerset), Roger fitz Adam (of Hampshire), 
and Hugh of Chacombe (of Warwickshire and Leicestershire) whose shrieval prof-
its declined, such that they offered sums for the king’s benevolence. They were 
removed from office.
17Harris [1964, p. 539] cites the case of William de Cahaignes, sheriff of Sus-
sex, who could not account for profit because he had none.
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regularly toured his kingdom to give court judgments18). This 
excess expenditure might offset other debts a sheriff owed.19 
The system did require much more careful accounting and 
administration, necessitating detailed records. This paperwork 
could have made the system unworkable, hence a good reason 
for sheriffs offering money to be relieved from implementing 
it. Equally possibly, it might have been perceived as another 
measure to extract more money from the same tax base, causing 
offence as it ran counter to what was customary and accept-
able.20 There are several explanations possible for the decline in 
income by 1214. By Michaelmas 1213, John had abandoned all 
the increments imposed not only by himself but by Richard too. 
The Pipe Roll for 1214 only accounts for the old increments im-
posed by Henry II. Unpopular sheriffs also were being removed 
from northern counties [Harris, 1964, p. 540]. However, the 
complexions of the farms had been radically altered by John’s 
procedures.
 As this system was initiated in 1204, it is likely that it 
stemmed from Hubert Walter’s thinking as a means to tap into 
hitherto untaxed shrieval profits. However, it is evident from the 
above that it continued unchecked to a level perceived as extor-
tion, which is an equally likely consequence of Walter’s no longer 
being there to monitor its implementation and development.
The Royal Forest: There are many stories of venality and harass-
ment in respect of the enforcement of forest law. Warren [1997, 
p. 152] says that “when John was in urgent need of cash he 
would send round a commission of forest justices.” Such a for-
est eyre21 in 1212 created debts on the Pipe Roll of £5,000 [War-
ren, 1987, pp. 162-163]. It is likely that such activity continued 
throughout John’s reign not just in the period after 1204.
Scutage: Scutage arose originally as a feudal due (servitia debita) 
owed to the king in respect of grants of land (fees) made to 
18Joliffe [1948, p. 123] expounds on how John made a significant innovation 
by organizing his cash and treasure supplies so that he could have ready access 
wherever he happened to be throughout England rather than concentrating them 
in London.
19Harris [1964, p. 536] also quotes the instances of Philip Mark and Engelard 
de Cigogne successfully claiming quittance from Exchequer demands for profits 
on the grounds that they had spent all sums owed on repairs to castles or on ac-
commodating the king and his followers early in the reign of Henry III.
20For example, efforts to introduce any sort of poll tax in England have foun-
dered, whether in the 14th century or the 20th.
21A forest eyre was an itinerant court dealing with forestry matters.
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tenants-in-chief. As a condition of occupying land and receiv-
ing rents from it, tenants were obliged to provide a number of 
knights to fight on the king’s behalf when called upon to do so. 
By the reigns of Richard and John, it was common for scutage 
to be commuted to a sum of money, a fine in lieu of military ser-
vice, often referred to as an aid on the knight’s fee.
 Henry II had tried to increase the number of fees by an 
inquest in 1166. It was here established clearly that there were 
fees in existence in excess of the servitia debita which became a 
potential target for raising additional revenue. We contend that, 
under John, the notion of the fine came into its own. In this 
sense, a fine is not a financial punishment for a violation of law 
or privilege (usually referred to as an amercement), but derives 
from the Latin word finis, which means at root “end.” Fines were 
used in settling an issue or bringing it to an end, most frequently 
in the sense of coming to a financial agreement over a particular 
matter. In addition to paying scutage, tenants often paid a sum 
of money in fine. Sometimes such payment was regarded as part 
of the scutage; sometimes it was dealt with separately.22 As to 
what the fine actually represented is, in any given case, unclear. 
It could be calculated as a single sum or a fixed amount per fee.
 Under John, the fine was extensively used as a result of 
the need to cover further increases in costs, ruralization of the 
population, and realization of the full feudal levy. While perhaps 
evident in the early years of John’s reign, the effect was greater 
with the more frequent levies of scutage after 1204. Mitchell 
[1914, p. 5] says that these “sums were called fines ne transfre­
tent or pro passagio.” The term “ne transfretent” means literally 
“in order that they should not cross the sea.” More exactly the 
word “fretum” contained in the verb transfretare means at root 
“strait,” so may refer not just to seas in general but to the Chan-
nel in particular. Perhaps the fine was paid so that no one had to 
serve overseas, be it tenant or knights, especially in France, but 
conceivably they could still be called upon to serve in England. 
“Pro passagio” literally means “for the passage” or “for the pass-
ing,” which could refer to the same idea, but is more likely to 
refer to the tenant-in-chief being granted permission by the king 
to recoup his scutage and fine from his own sub-tenants and 
lesser vassals.
 The fines “ne transfretent” and “pro passagio” seem likely 
22The view of Maitland [Pollock and Maitland, 1898, pp. 269-270, cited by 
Chew, 1922, 1923] that the scutage and fine were the same thing; that is, payments 
inflicted as punishment for disobeying a call to arms, is not now accepted.
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to have been exploitations of different aspects of knights not 
serving in person. Serving overseas was unpopular as evidenced 
by the northern barons in 1214 refusing to undertake an expe-
dition to Poitou on the grounds that service overseas was not 
due. One argument for compliance with John’s demands was 
that the feudal spirit was deeply imbued in the tenants-in-chief. 
They knew that the king could insist on full military service 
which would likely be more expensive than scutage proper plus 
fine. Despite the opportunity for enrichment from war booty, 
a knight going overseas on a military campaign of unspecified 
duration would require substantial support in terms of horses 
and equipment, all of which he or his overlord had to provide. 
The commutation of scutage to money, even if accompanied by 
the fine, meant that the amount of financial commitment had 
known limits [Harvey, 1970], which would not be the case with 
an actual campaign where the duration and cost could not be 
known at the outset. Also, given the established fact that there 
were more fees in existence than the servitia debita, a threat of 
re-assessment and reform of the servitia debita to reflect the true 
situation in his reign always hung over the tenants-in-chiefs’ 
heads.23 However, it does seem as if different aspects of “not 
serving” were exploited under John, and scutage was becoming 
divided into two different taxes, much like the proficuum from 
county farms considered above. As an additional levy over and 
above a base amount, this use of the fine is so similar to the 
proficuum that it is hard to resist the conclusion that the idea 
behind it stemmed from the same mind, that of Hubert Walter. 
It was an exploitation of an existing device to which tenants-in-
chief had been long accustomed, but here it seems to have been 
given a new twist.
 It is significant that fines were not necessarily levied at the 
same rate per individual, and there is a possibility that this ele-
ment was negotiable. As the fine represented an amount over 
and above a fixed rate, allowing a level of variation not fea-
sible in the fixed rate, it could be tailored to the payee’s circum-
stances. John and Walter may have also learned from the failure 
of John’s father to extend the scope of scutage. The fine under 
John is likely to have achieved what Henry II had set out to do, 
but in a more subtle manner. John did not seek to levy scutage 
proper on an increased number of fees, but he succeeded in 
23That there were greater numbers of knights in John’s reign is the implica-
tion throughout the survey by Faulkner [1996], though she looks at knights in 
13th century England to establish this contention.
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 raising extra money by way of fine. The permission granted (“pro 
passagio,” perhaps) meant that tenants-in-chief could recoup 
moneys from sub-tenants or knights whom they themselves had 
enfeoffed.24 There is a strong suggestion that John had achieved 
what Henry had set out to do, but had avoided tampering with 
familiar feudal institutions to do it. The subtlety of the handling 
suggests Walter at work here again.
 In contrast, the later part of John’s reign witnessed an inten-
sification of this method of revenue raising, as can be seen from 
Table 1. The restraining influence of Walter seems conspicuous 
by its absence. Table 1 below lists the scutages levied during 
John’s reign.
TABLE 1
Scutages Levied by King John 1204-1214
Rate per feea Year Reason
20s 1204 war against Philip Augustus
20s 1205 invasion of Poitou and Gascony
20s 1206 invasion of France
20s 1209 war against Scotland
2m (26s 8d) 1210 expedition to Ireland
3m (40s) 1211 two expeditions against the Welsh
3m (40s) 1214 invasion of Poitou
Source: Mitchell, 1914
a Here s denotes shilling, d denotes pence, and m denotes mark. One mark was 
roughly two-thirds of one English pound sterling, worth in turn 20 shillings. A 
pound contained 240 pence. These “old” pounds and pence remained the basic 
English currency until decimal currency was introduced in 1972.
 Some of John’s later campaigns appear questionable in 
military terms. Thus, the basis of the scutage was less valid and 
prompted resistance. In 1209, he marched north as far as Nor-
ham, apparently against the Scots, but concluded a truce with-
out any fighting taking place. The barons opposed the expedition 
to Poitou and Gascony. In 1214, the northern barons particularly 
opposed fighting in Poitou on the grounds that service overseas 
was not due. The lack of military validity for the campaigns 
24Tenants-in-chief, in certain circumstances, were permitted to create their 
own knights, who stood in relation to the tenant-in-chief creating them as the 
tenant-in-chief did to the king. The tenant-in-chief thus provided his own retain-
ers with a fee (they were thus enfeoffed) to support them. The retainers’ fees were 
granted from the tenant-in-chief’s own fee.
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from 1209 and after may reflect extortion measures rather than 
genuine attempts to raise revenue needed for campaigns.
Carucage: John raised tax by use of this method only once, in 
1200. It seems to have been based on Hubert Walter’s earlier 
attempt to implement a similar tax in 1198 to raise money for 
war with France [Jurkowski et al., 1998, pp. xvii-xix]. In 1200, 
the tax was for a specific purpose; namely, to raise the 20,000 
marks John had promised Philip Augustus as a relief for his 
lands in France. It met with considerable opposition, especially 
from the Cistercian monks, and was described by Abbot Ralph 
of Coggeshall as a “very heavy exaction which greatly impover-
ished the peoples of the land” [Carpenter, 1998, p. 1220]. The tax 
was based on the number of plough teams and aimed to assess 
all property regardless of whether held by the Church or some 
other form of tenure [Mitchell, 1951, p. 108]. There is no record 
of how the tax was collected or administered, or how much it 
raised. It seems to have been an attempt to bring a much older 
tax, the danegeld,25 up to date, but was unsuccessful and un-
popular. There was an elaborate procedure for assessing liability 
[Warren, 1987, p. 147], but collection was hampered by the ad-
ministrative machinery required to implement it. However, in 
its attempt to use plough land as a basis of assessment, it would 
have affected the vast majority of the population given that 
England was primarily an agricultural society. Unusually for an 
initiative specifically attributable to Walter, it did not succeed. As 
danegeld was a tax with long-established roots and familiar as a 
land-based tax, re-introducing it in a revised form might have 
been expected to succeed. In its attempt to be exact and wide-
reaching, it seems ahead of its time. Mitchell [1951, p. 154] sug-
gests that it was an attempt to create an effective land tax, and 
its lack of success was a result of the levies on personal property 
or movables proving more immediately lucrative and easier to 
administer as liabilities were less difficult to calculate.
25Danegeld was a very old tax and like carucage was based on a measure of 
land known as a hidage. It was levied originally to provide resources to fight the 
Danes, hence its name, but only appears to have been given the name danegeld 
in the 12th century. Henry I levied it regularly, but Henry II only twice. It fell into 
disuse, largely because the geldable lands could not provide sufficient sums to 
fund expensive continental wars [see Frecknall Hughes and Oats, 2004, pp. 217-
218]. Also, records as to which were geldable lands had been lost in large part as 
a result of the civil war between Stephen and Matilda, which preceded Henry II’s 
reign. Both Warren [2000, pp. 263-264] and Hollister [2001, p. 336] state that un-
der Henry I and Henry II very many exemptions were granted from it.
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Tallage: Tallage was a customary, if arbitrary, tax levied on the 
towns and domain land of the Crown. It was another way of 
increasing the yield from the royal domain. It was applied to 
unfree tenants and was a parallel to the “gracious aid”26 or 
auxilium which could be levied from vassals and free tenants. 
Something of the nature of an “aid” was evident in tallage also 
as it was only taken “when the king had urgent need of addition-
al money, and although it could be imposed at the king’s will, it 
could not be refused, the amount to be paid was not determined 
arbitrarily but was open to negotiation” [Warren, 1987, p. 154].
 Under John, the levies of tallage were much more frequent 
than previously, with per capita assessments being used in pref-
erence to collective offers.27 Tallage was collected nine times in 
one form or another during John’s reign often reflecting scutage 
in the same years. Not all areas were assessed in total. The 1199-
1200 tallage appears to have been general [Mitchell, 1914, p. 31], 
but that of 1201 was collected in the bishopric of Lincoln and 
Yorkshire, while some sort of aid was collected only in the Chan-
nel Islands [Mitchell, 1914, p. 45]. In 1203, it was collected in 13 
counties with an account of collections.
 In the period before 1204-05, tallage was levied three times, 
but six times afterwards. Consistent with our proposition that 
1204-05 marked a watershed in John’s approach to fiscal exac-
tions, both the frequency and the coverage of the tallage in-
creased after 1204. In 1204, it was collected in 14 counties, 26 
counties in 1205, and 32 counties in 1206 [Mitchell, 1914, pp. 
61, 68, 76, 82]. It was collected in 1210 from cities, towns, the 
king’s manors and lands in hand [Mitchell, 1914, p. 100], with 
the Jews being tallaged for 66,000 marks as well in that year. 
One of the chroniclers reports that at the beginning of 1210 all 
Jews in England, men and women, were arrested by order of the 
king and tortured to force them to give up their wealth [Norgate, 
1902, p. 137].
 A final tallage is recorded in John’s reign in 1214, charged 
against manors and towns, with the aim of raising money to 
help pay the indemnity for the withdrawal of the papal inter-
dict,28 originally at 100,000 marks [Mitchell, 1914, p. 117]. The 
26“Gracious” here meant “reasonable.”
27A per capita assessment is one where each individual was assessed. A collec-
tive offer is an amount offered on behalf of a community, such as a village or reli-
gious order, a body of persons typically working or living together in some way.
28The significance of the papal interdict was immense. It meant that England 
was, in effect, excommunicated. Although baptism and confession of the dying 
were permitted, no other religious rites were, the idea being to rouse “the faithful 
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method of imposition, which was based around a collective offer 
or a per capita assessment, seems to have been effective in terms 
of collection, thus contributing to its overall success.
Dona or Auxilia: An auxilium was an aid, given voluntarily in 
theory to assist royal finances. There were three occasions on 
which it was normal for a “gracious aid” to be raised – for the 
king’s ransom, for knighting the king’s son, and for marrying the 
king’s eldest daughter [Ormrod, 1999, p. 27]. Dona were gifts, 
often raised from religious houses or churchmen, although the 
terminology seems rather blurred. Aid was often used to refer 
to a tax in general (for example, scutage was often referred to 
as an aid on the knight’s fee), and a gift might be anything but a 
gift. Calling it so, however, was perhaps useful in disguising the 
nature of the exaction.
 Some religious houses paid a contribution in 1199 which 
was variously referred to as a donum, promissum, or tallagium 
[Mitchell, 1914, pp. 32, 61]; a Dorset exaction in 1203 was called 
an auxilium. Widespread charges against religious houses are 
unlikely to have been encouraged under the aegis of Walter as 
he also had held the post of Archbishop of Canterbury. How-
ever, these levies increased after 1204-05. It is significant to note 
that these high charges were levied in the years of the interdict. 
There was no religious authority to stand in John’s way and no 
chancellor sympathetic to the Church.
The Tax on Movables: Taxes on movable property to raise state 
revenue were not used until the 12th century and then not ex-
tensively. They were common in terms of the ecclesiastical tithe, 
so the concept was familiar. The tax applied to movable goods, 
including gold, silver plate and ornaments, and animals, but 
not to precious stones or clothes [Jurkowski et al., 1998. p. xiii]. 
Previously, these taxes had been used to raise levies for the Holy 
Land, for example, the Saladin Tithe of 1188 and the ransom for 
Richard I. These were exceptional in every way and appealed to 
a deep moral obligation, but were both novel and national. John, 
almost certainly instructed in these precedents by Walter who 
had been active in raising the ransom to free Richard, imposed 
the tax on four occasions during his reign.
 In 1201, a levy of one fortieth of the revenues of one year 
against the faithless” [Warren, 1997, p. 164]. It made not only the guilty suffer, but 
also the innocent, hence its potency as a weapon. See also the section on church 
revenues.
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was raised in accordance with the Pope’s request for aid for 
the Holy Land. Churchmen paid by order of the Pope on their 
spiritualities and temporalities. The money was collected by the 
bishop of each diocese. The king also contributed a fortieth part 
of the revenues of his domain, escheats, wardships, and lands in 
hand. He asked earls, barons, knights, and freemen to contribute 
at the same rate. There was no formal assessment as each man 
calculated the amount of his contribution. A roll was drawn up 
by the collectors, arranged by vills,29 containing the names of the 
contributors and the amount paid by each. The royal domain 
contribution was recorded on a separate roll. Those who refused 
to pay were reported by name to the king [Mitchell, 1914, p. 
45]. Although it is unlikely that the tax raised was substantial, 
the detailed accounting and the machinery of collection were 
novel and were a forerunner for other levies of this sort in John’s 
reign, such as “the fifteenth” as it became known, collected in 
1204 on the property of merchants. This latter tax was novel in 
that it was a form of customs duty levied at the ports. Warren 
[1997, p. 122] comments that, although this tax is dated 1204, 
it was in operation at least two years earlier.30 Barratt [1996, 
p. 841] felt the tax was so insignificant that he disregards it in 
his revenue calculations in the absence of substantial evidence. 
However, Ormrod [1999, p. 32] considers that it was the progen-
itor of later customs duties which came to be part of the Crown’s 
ordinary revenue. The tax lasted for about five years until a 
truce with Philip Augustus of France again allowed free trade.31 
It was a measure instituted to control trade with the continent, 
especially France and a part of John’s wider plan to ensure that 
maritime power was in his hands. Restrictions on trade were 
so unpopular with merchants that it prompted clause 41 of the 
Magna Carta, affirming their freedom to come and go at will.
 In 1203, a levy of one-seventh of the personal property of 
earls and barons was made [Mitchell, 1914, p. 54]. There is some 
confusion as to the rationale as the chroniclers report that it was 
taken on the pretext that the barons had deserted John on his 
return to England in December 1203. However, as the tax was 
levied in the summer, this rationale may not be valid. It seems to 
have been some sort of general levy, possibly of tenants-in-chief 
29A vill was the smallest acknowledged national community measure, con-
sisting of a number of households and their respective land. The modern word 
“village” is derived from it.
30Rot. Pat., i. 42
31Wars with France were endemic in the 12th and 13th centuries.
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and clergy. In 1203 also, a levy of a fifth part of one-year’s rev-
enues was taken in the Channel Islands on the lands of bishops, 
abbots, clerks, knights, rear-vassals, and others to support the 
knights and sergeants defending the islands [Mitchell, 1914, pp. 
62-63]. Greater attention was apparently being paid to personal 
property as a means of raising tax. Cheney [1967, p. 79] spe-
cifically comments on the chronicler Roger of Wendover who 
attributed a significant role to Hubert Walter in exacting the 
seventh of 1203 from the clergy.
 The largest levy of this kind, in the second part of John’s 
reign, was “the thirteenth” (actually 12 pence in the mark) of 
revenues and movables taken in 1207. The levy seems to have 
been requested in the form of a “gracious aid,” which was un-
usual but not without feudal precedent among the tenants them-
selves. However, John had no immediate need of these funds, 
and it seems to have been collected against a perceived future 
need to recover lands lost to Philip Augustus in France which 
could have been genuine or a mere pretext. John persuaded a 
council of his barons to agree to this charge on them, though 
not without protest. Prelates in a first council had refused this 
levy on beneficed clergy although both laity and clergy did later 
pay it. Many clergy paid a lump sum in fine. It was collected by 
a means similar to the levy of 1188, although by teams of special 
justices sent to each county, with as many as 14 reported for 
Lincolnshire. It seems to have raised about £60,000 [Mitchell, 
1914, pp. 84-92; Warren, 1987, pp. 148-149]. A separate Ex-
chequer of the Thirteenth was established to collect the tax 
although no overall accounts survive. There are some references 
in the Pipe Roll of the main Exchequer for Michaelmas 1207 
[Jurkowski et al., 1998, p. 8]. The penalty for refusing to comply 
with procedures was forfeiture of chattels and indefinite impris-
onment. The Archbishop of York, for example, was forced into 
exile and his lands seized for opposing the tax [Mitchell, 1951, 
p. 8].
 This tax of 1207 was an important step away from feudal 
taxation towards national taxation. It was levied against an 
unspecified future need, on property not land, and paid by 
most classes of society, excepting some clergy. It was collected 
nationally by royal justices, using the vill and a form of self-
 assessment. It was legitimized because it had been agreed with 
a council of barons who represented the community in general 
that would suffer it. Unlike the county farm, which was payable 
in installments, and special levies (e.g., scutages and tallages) 
which, although due all at once, were paid over a period of time, 
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the 1207 tax on movables was designed for immediate collec-
tion in full. “The county commissioners were to deliver the rolls 
of assessment to the sheriff every two weeks and the collection 
was to be made with all possible haste” [Jurkowski et al., 1998, 
p. 105]. Harriss [1975, p. 18] comments that “the language of 
the writ for the levy of the thirteenth in 1207 was more national 
than feudal in tone,” while Maddicott [1997, p. 24] explicitly re-
fers to it as “heavy national taxation” and sees it, in conjunction 
with John’s more frequent scutage levies, as a measure which 
“extended the social and fiscal range of royal government” and 
at the root of clause 14 of the original Magna Carta.
Other (Incidental) Income: After 1194, Richard had increasingly 
exploited incidental revenue sources and fines relating to feudal 
incidents. John continued these practices but took them to ex-
tremes. Many of the examples cited by historians fall firmly into 
the period after 1204-05. Under John, fines were “imposed arbi-
trarily...and cynically developed...into a financial straightjacket 
intended to control the ‘loyalty’ of the barons” [Barratt, 2001, p. 
653]. A particular method used by John to control his tenants in 
this way was by keeping them, or encouraging them to become, 
indebted to the Crown [Barratt, 1999, p. 77]. Warren [1997, p. 
182] lists ways in which tenants might get into the Exchequer’s 
toils. A man might commit a misdemeanor, such as allowing an 
outlaw to escape, making a false claim, or putting a fish weir 
in a river without the king’s permission. He might be amerced 
(fined) for the offense. Usually the amount of his amercement 
would be assessed by his peers in the king’s court, but John 
would prefer to have the tenant buy his goodwill at exorbitant 
rates. Warren [1997, p. 182] cites the instance of Roger de Cressi 
marrying an heiress without the king’s permission. John seized 
the lands of both until Roger came to make his peace. It cost 
him 1,200 marks and 12 palfreys32 (horses) to obtain the king’s 
goodwill and regain his lands. As he was constantly moving 
about his kingdom, John could detect even small transgressions; 
for example, in 1210, Robert de Vaux was obliged to give the 
32Latimer [1999, p. 52] comments that “[i]n the twelfth and thirteenth cen-
turies, when a good war-horse might cost over one hundred times as much as a 
plough-horse, a horse was anything but just a horse. . . . Outside of agriculture a 
broad range of types of horses occurs in the sources: pack- or sumpter-horses; 
rounceys; palfreys; hunters; chasers; destriers, and many beasts of widely differ-
ing value, described unhelpfully as ‘horses’.” The palfrey is significant, however, 
because “as the staple riding-horse of lords, knights and officials, it constituted a 
normal and important expense for the upper ranks of society.”
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king five palfreys “to keep quiet about the wife of Henry Pinel”33 
and to pay 750 marks for goodwill.
 Generally, sums due in respect of feudal incidents were 
more than tenants could pay at any one time. Thus, they would 
become the king’s debtors, often for many years, which gave 
the king financial power over them, especially since he required 
their estates pledged formally to the Exchequer. A debtor who 
defaulted could have his lands forfeited as, for example, the Earl 
of Leicester between 1207 and 1215. Allied to this notion was 
the use of financial resources to reward friends and followers. 
For example, an heiress might be given as wife instead of an 
individual having to pay the king for the right to marry her or 
a wardship might be similarly granted [Church, 1995, pp. 288-
289]. Many persons in debt had recourse to Jewish money lend-
ers but this solution was not necessarily an escape. There was 
the interest to pay and if a money lender died, the Crown was 
automatically heir.
 John seemed to use these powers to cripple individuals fi-
nancially simply because they were powerful or because he had 
become suspicious of them. William de Briouze had flourished 
under John, but died in exile in 1211 after being driven from 
his lands and from the country as a result of John’s disfavor. His 
wife and son died in one of John’s prisons, starved to death de-
spite an offer of a ransom of 40,000 marks. Since every chronicle 
of the period contains a reference to this story [Warren, 1997, p. 
185], it must have caused a very deep impression at the time.
Church Revenues: In consequence of John refusing to accept 
Stephen Langton34 as Pope Innocent III’s appointee to the see of 
Canterbury after the death of Hubert Walter, England was put 
under a papal interdict which lasted from 1208 to 1214. This 
meant that England was cut off from the influence and benefit 
of all religion. At a time when Catholicism was the predominant 
faith in Europe and the Pope wielded immense power over the 
entirety of the Christian world, the significance of the interdict 
should not be underestimated. Notwithstanding the seriousness 
33Warren [1997, p. 182], citing Pipe Roll 12 John
34John’s refusal was not unreasonable per se. Langton was the Pope’s appoint-
ee, preferred because he would carry out Innocent III’s planned religious reform 
program. It was usual, however, for monarchs to have appointed to such key po-
sitions a person whom they themselves wanted. John had a far from ineligible 
candidate of his own in John de Gray, his own secretary and Bishop of Norwich, 
who was well known in England whereas Langton was not [Warren, 1997, pp. 
160-163].
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of the interdict in religious terms, John moved quickly to exploit 
the financial opportunities it presented. Almost immediately 
after the interdict was declared, royal officers moved in to seize 
church property [Harper-Bill, 1999, p. 306]. John let it be known 
that the clergy could only regain it if they paid for the privilege, 
although even then the king retained some portion of the church 
revenues [Warren, 1997, pp. 167-168]. It would appear that 
the Angevin35 rulers in general were well aware of the financial 
resources of the Church although Harper-Bill [1999, p. 303] 
comments that “John was probably no more assertive or rapa-
cious in his relationship with the Church before 1205, and even 
before 1208, than his royal predecessors.” However, the presence 
of Walter as Archbishop of Canterbury in the period before his 
death in 1205 would have deflected royal attention away from 
church property and revenues.
 John’s finances were immensely increased in the years of the 
interdict, with profits from bishoprics taken in hand amounting 
to £9,275 in the year 1212 alone [Bartlett, 2000, p. 405]. How-
ever, he was not dissuaded from levying other taxes. It is not 
 really possible to estimate exactly how much the church rev-
enues brought in [Warren, 1997, p. 168]. If church lands fell va-
cant because of the death of an abbot, John took them in hand. 
In all, 17 monasteries had suffered this fate by 1213 [Warren, 
1997, p. 173]. The disquietude prompted by the king arrogating 
church lands in such a way resonates in Magna Carta clause 46, 
which states that an abbey founded by barons under charter or 
of which they have had long tenure “shall have custody in a va-
cancy, as [it] ought to have.” 
 The interdict, though profitable for John, could not last 
forever. The barons, however, did not object as money was 
coming into the king’s coffers “without drawing a single penny 
from their own” [Norgate, 1902, p. 128]. Nonetheless, many of 
John’s officials were drawn from the clergy so that the longer 
the interdict lasted, the more uncomfortable they became with 
their dual position as servants of Crown and Church. Moreover, 
subservience, rather than otherwise, to the Church of Rome was 
35“Angevin” is a term used to describe the line of kings directly descended 
from Geoffrey Plantagenet, Count of Anjou, and his wife Matilda (sometimes 
called Maud), the daughter of Henry I. Hence, Henry II, Richard I, John, and 
sometimes John’s son, Henry III, are often referred to as Angevins. However, be-
cause of their descent, they are also seen as the first in the line of Plantagenet 
kings, and there is no hard and fast rule about terminology. Henry III too is often 
referred to as Plantagenet, although it would be unusual to find any king after 
Henry III being referred to as Angevin.
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the norm. It cost John 100,000 marks to end the interdict in 
1214, 40,000 before it was lifted and 12,000 per year thereafter. 
Of the 40,000 marks, 13,000 were pardoned [Warren, 1997, p. 
210]. Even then, John took a tallage to raise the revenue to pay 
the remainder.
 Taken together, the changes in the way taxes, broadly de-
fined, were raised after 1204-05 represent a marked departure 
from previous practice. No doubt this was in part the result 
of the loss of Normandy in 1204, which created for John a fis-
cal exigency requiring increased funds. Moreover, the death 
of Walter in 1205 removed any moderating influence in John’s 
revenue-raising strategies. However, John’s increasing defiance 
of custom and practice in his fiscal impositions led to resistance 
which culminated in the baronial rebellion and the demand for 
a charter of liberties. It is to the outcome of this struggle that the 
next section of the paper turns.
MAGNA CARTA36
 Although the interpretation of the Magna Carta as a docu-
ment of constitutional significance should not be underestimat-
ed, its original intent was not to lay down basic constitutional 
freedoms or to be a statement of law. Rather, it was primarily 
intended as a remedy for specific grievances, especially financial 
ones. Indeed, the 25 leading barons who acted as surety for the 
agreement and who were involved in its drafting all had griev-
ances against John. Stephen Langton, the chief negotiator and 
“deal-broker,” for instance, had been kept out of the lucrative 
office of Archbishop of Canterbury for the entire period of the 
papal interdict. Although the document has explicit references 
to the need for due process in its 61 wide-ranging clauses, these 
usually relate to financial matters. The implicit suggestion that 
the consent of parties involved in such matters be required 
should not be taken to have a wider meaning than the immedi-
ate context implies [see Maddicott, 1997, pp. 17, 22, on clause 
14 of the original document]. The document primarily seeks to 
limit the financial power of the king. 
 If one looks at the specific clauses in the document in the 
light of John’s exactions detailed in this paper, the nature of the 
document as a rebellion against financial grievances becomes 
very visible. For example, in the context of the county farm, 
36An easily accessible version of the complete document is available on the 
British Library website at http://www.bl.uk/treasures/magnacarta/magna.html.
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clause 25 initially renounced the increments imposed by John, 
although this concession was omitted from re-issues. The issue 
became contentious again under Henry III [Warren, 1987, p. 
153, citing Maddicott, 1984, pp. 28-30, 44-46]. The resentment 
seems not only to be concerned with John’s development of the 
proficuum but to have extended back to the original increment. 
What was once acceptable, now as a result of John’s extreme 
measures, became unacceptable.
 John’s exploitation of the royal forest was harsh enough to 
merit specific clauses in the Magna Carta (44, 47, 48, and 53). In 
particular, clause 47 disforests all areas which John had in his 
time designated as forest. Indeed, one of the original demands 
of 1215 was that the forest be reduced to the boundaries that 
existed at Henry I’s coronation. John probably did not extend 
forest boundaries as much as his forebears had done, but as 
Warren [1997, p. 152] comments, “perhaps he had no need to: 
he made a lot of money out of what there was.”
 Scutage is directly referred to in Magna Carta, clause 12 
where it is stated that no scutage shall be taken unless by com-
mon counsel, unless for ransom, making the king’s eldest son a 
knight, or marrying the king’s eldest daughter. Clause 14 also re-
quires “common counsel” also in assessing an aid (form unspec-
ified) and scutage. Clause 14 goes on to specify that “common 
counsel” comprised archbishops, bishops, abbots, earls, greater 
barons, and major tenants, with proper summons and notice 
being given. Clause 15 likewise prevents anyone levying an “aid” 
from his own freedmen. The implication here is that John had 
been attempting to levy scutage, if not at will, at least for unac-
ceptable reasons. Table 1 shows that the rates in 1211 and 1214 
were higher than anything previously levied.37 The comments 
made above about fines “ne tranfretent” and “pro passagio,” are 
indicative of the unpopularity and expense of providing for 
the king’s overseas campaigns [Harvey, 1970]. Not surprisingly, 
clause 12 of Magna Carta indicates that demands for scutage 
should be agreed by all where imposed for military purposes, an 
indication of how strongly those affected by it felt.
 Relevant here is the citation by Mitchell [1914, pp. 23-24] 
of instances of apparent double exaction since scutage was paid 
by individuals whose knights did go on expedition with the king. 
37Henry II levied scutage six times in his 35-year reign at rates of one and 
two marks and 20 shillings per fee. Richard I levied the tax four times in his ten-
year reign at rates of ten or 20 shillings per fee [see Barratt, 1999, p. 637, 2001, 
p. 839].
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Although his knights were with the king, the Abbot of Ramsey 
paid eight marks on his four fees,38 as did the Bishop of Win-
chester.39 Similarly, the Earl of Devon had knights in the king’s 
service and paid 30 marks scutage.40 It seems generally true that 
tenants who performed their service received writs of quittance, 
and were therefore not to be held liable for scutage. However, if 
the tenant had fees which were in a different county, there might 
be a delay to the issue of a writ of quittance and on this pretext 
scutage levied. Clause 16 of Magna Carta stated that no one shall 
be compelled to do greater service than is due in respect of their 
land holding, strongly suggesting that “double service” (paying 
money and going on campaign) occurred frequently enough to 
be resented.
 In terms of incidental income, clauses 10 and 11 of Magna 
Carta refer explicitly to the treatment of those who might die 
with debts remaining unpaid to Jewish money lenders. These 
clauses specified that the heirs shall not pay interest while un-
der age, and if the debt falls into the king’s hands, he will only 
reclaim the principal. A widow would retain her dowry in such 
circumstances, and after provision for minor children, debts 
were to be paid out of the residues of the estate. The need to re-
establish protection against such practices suggests the presence 
of considerable exploitation of these situations. Similar rights 
were extended to different ranks of society who died in debt, al-
though not necessarily to Jewish money lenders (clauses 26 and 
27 refer to holders of lay fiefs and freedmen respectively).
 There are several references in Magna Carta to amerce-
ments and determinations of their proper imposition on various 
types of individuals and appropriate rates (clauses 20, 21, and 
22). Clause 55 details a procedure to deal with amercements 
and fines imposed unjustly by the king against the law of the 
land. As mentioned above, the royal court dispensing justice 
was peripatetic in John’s reign, but Magna Carta Clause 17 es-
tablished a fixed place for common pleas (suits concerning real 
property). Clauses 18, 19, 24, 32, 34, 36, 38, 39, and 54 likewise 
established procedures for other assizes and legal procedures so 
that they were not dependent necessarily on the king’s presence 
or whim. Clause 40 explicitly agreed that the king would not sell, 
delay, or refuse justice to anyone. It is significant that the selling 
of justice has foremost mention in this clause.
38Pipe Roll, 1 and 7, John, Cambridgeshire and Huntingdonshire
39Pipe Roll, 2 John, Hampshire, m. 7 d
40Pipe Roll, 1 John, Devon, m. 14 d; 2 John, Devon
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 The references in Magna Carta to feudal incidents are nu-
merous. Clauses 2 and 3 refer to inheritance “taxes,” standard-
izing the amount of “reliefs” payable at “old” rates by an heir 
who was of age to succeed to his father’s title and lands. An 
underage heir, when reaching adulthood, would not have to pay 
a relief or fine. Clauses 4 to 8 refer to matters consequent on the 
death of a tenant-in-chief. Guardians of underage heirs should 
be accountable for their activities and should not be allowed to 
enrich themselves at the expense of those whose property they 
held in trust. Heirs should not be sold in marriage by the king to 
the highest bidder but allied to one of similar social standing. A 
widow should regain her dowry as of right, be allowed a period 
of residence in her former home, and not be compelled to marry 
against her will. The placing of these clauses at the beginning 
of the document indicates the significance of these issues to the 
barons.
 In this context, it is not then surprising to find clause 9 of 
the Magna Carta saying that land cannot be seized for debt if a 
debtor’s chattels are sufficient to pay the debt. Clause 49 allowed 
that hostages and charters given to the king by Englishmen 
should be returned. The king promised in clauses 58 and 59 
that nobly born and royal Welsh and Scottish hostages would be 
returned. Clause 52 likewise promises to return lands, castles, 
franchises, and “right” to anyone “dispossessed or removed” 
by the king “without legal judgement of his peers,” including 
Welshmen (clauses 56 and 57). It seems clear that John had his 
own “strong arm” retainers who gained unsavory reputations for 
enforcing his will in circumstances such as these, men such as 
the relations of Gerard d’Athée and others named in clause 50, 
who were to be removed from their bailiwicks, along with for-
eign knights and men-at-arms (clause 51). The presence of for-
eigners acting as advisers to the king caused considerable unrest 
and resentment, a not unexpected reaction among high ranking 
families who had been used to Walter’s subtleties and diplomacy. 
Prevention of such strong-arm tactics is also inherent in clauses 
such as 28 and 30 which refer to the seizure of goods and chat-
tels without payment or permission of their owners.
CONCLUSION
 John’s reign is important in tax history for two main rea-
sons. On the one hand, the development of the notion of consent 
to, and legitimacy of, taxation, which arose from perceived 
extortion and the “innovative” over-use of measures to raise 
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revenue is evident. On the other hand, the need for more regular 
taxation to provide funds to run government heralded the begin-
nings of a process of transition from a domain-based to a tax-
based state. The need to derive additional revenue from sources 
such as taxation, and not wholly from assets under a ruler’s 
personal control, to finance military and other ambitions and 
to administer increasingly complex machinery of government, 
moved the state increasingly towards being tax-based. The com-
bined result of these simultaneous developments makes John’s 
reign immeasurably significant from a taxation perspective.
 We have argued that the nature of the changes in revenue 
collection under John can be divided into two distinct periods. 
The first, from his accession in 1199 until the loss of Normandy 
and death of Walter in 1204-05, is a period in which moderate 
increases in the scope and rates of taxes were generally evident. 
Subsequently, until Magna Carta in 1215, a different pattern of 
taxation emerges, with more radical changes in both the nature 
and extent of the exactions prompting considerable resentment. 
Taxes illegitimately imposed by John were considered extreme 
and therefore extortion. In response, there was a growing recog-
nition that taxation needed to be justified and could not be im-
posed merely by the will of the king; the consent of those taxed 
was required. The need for regulation was shown particularly 
in “the thirteenth” of 1207 and later scutages. The resentment 
inherent in the development of the Magna Carta’s clauses is a 
clear response to a perceived arbitrary and punitive imposition 
of taxes, as well as unregulated actions in respect of goods and 
property. In such circumstances, the remarkable thing is that 
the Magna Carta took so long to happen. Walter’s influence in 
initially developing and applying John’s fiscal measures may 
explain this development in part. That his contemporaries were 
glad to be free of John is evident in the remark of the chronicler, 
Gerald of Wales, who commented on the yoke of slavery be-
ing lifted by his death. The chains were clearly financial ones 
[Bartlett, 2000, p. 66].
 In the course of John’s reign, attempts occurred to increase 
royal revenues, both ordinary and extraordinary, by almost any 
means possible. John had several reasons for requiring addition-
al finance – the loss of Normandy and its revenues; continued 
wars with France; the need to pay more officials to administer 
government; continuation of his predecessor’s policies, such as 
castle maintenance; inheriting a realm already depleted by the 
Third Crusade and the ransom paid for Richard; and, most prob-
ably, personal greed. All contemporary sources seem to agree on 
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this personal trait of John. It is possible to track these attempts, 
in part because of the increased record keeping which evolved 
in the 12th century, itself a significant feature of the age. It was 
necessary to keep track of increasingly complicated tax assess-
ment and collection mechanisms, such as for the proficuum or 
the attempt to introduce carucage. There is a wealth of records, 
such as the Pipe Rolls, for John’s reign in comparison with those 
of earlier monarchs. While their survival may be a happy acci-
dent, it seems clear that there were more produced. The records 
simultaneously kept track of financial material and facilitated 
the development of the tax system. These records underlie the 
interpretation of Magna Carta posited in this paper. The sig-
nificance we have attributed to Magna Carta as essentially an 
attempt to remedy fundamental grievances resulting from John’s 
revenue-raising activities extends understanding of a key period 
of medieval financial history.
 The period is also important, as our examination of John’s 
fiscal policies reveals, because of the change that came about 
in the nature of taxation, from feudal dues to taxes that had a 
national character. They were increasingly levied on property 
other than land and so applied to a wider cross section of soci-
ety. This new direction is evident not only from the attempt to 
develop carucage as a replacement for danegeld, but from the 
increasing frequency with which taxes such as scutage and taxes 
on movables were levied. Scutage before John had been used to 
provide actual men-at-arms for war. Under John, it was increas-
ingly levied as money, with the use of the fine being developed 
to allow the tax gathered from tenants-in-chief to be recouped 
from sub-tenants, thus widening the scope of the tax. John also 
endeavored to levy tax for unspecified future needs, as in the 
case of “the thirteenth” in 1207 and the later scutages. These at-
tempts to raise tax for general, as opposed to specific, purposes 
were an important step towards distinguishing the economic 
needs of the state from those of its ruler. However, the resent-
ment prompted by these attempts shows the difficulties inherent 
in this concept; the attempts were viewed as extortion, not as 
efforts to put the state on a sound financial footing. Changes on 
such a scale, which represented such a marked departure from 
previous practices and objectives, were always likely to stimulate 
considerable resistance. How far that resistance could have been 
ameliorated by the political management skills of Hubert Walter 
is a moot point. What is clear is that without such restraining 
influence, John’s increasingly exploitative tax policies were 
always likely to exacerbate it. This resistance and the resulting 
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 settlement negotiated with John by the barons, embodied in 
Magna Carta, created precedents for the use of taxation which 
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